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CASE COMMENTS

excuse for his failure to speak in denial." See also, 7 M.I Evidence
§ 231 (1949); 80 A.L.R. 1259 (1932).
While West Virginia appears to be committed by the Brooker
case to the view that such evidence is admissible, it is not quite
as apparent just what weight this evidence is to be given. This issue
was raised in the principal case when the accused, according to
the reported facts, was convicted and sentenced to fifteen to twenty
years imprisonment upon the corroborating testimony of an addictinformer and the implied admission by silence. Under Illinois law,
as reported by the court, the testimony of one credible witness is
sufficient to support a conviction for the unlawful sale of narcotics.
The Brooker case involved homicide rather than the unlawful sale
of narcotics. The record presented to the court did not purport to
contain all the evidence adduced at the trial and thus the court
assumed that sufficient evidence existed. However, dicta in the
Brooker case presented the issue as to the quantum of evidence, if
any, necessary in addition to the admission by silence to support
a conviction. The court stated that, alone, such an admission may be
insufficient to convict. While the court recognized the duty of the
jury to determine the weight to be accorded the evidence, it nevertheless indicated that, as a matter of law, it may be necessary that
such an admission have the support of other evidence.
Thus, it appears debatable as to how much corroborating testimony will be necessary to carry the issue to the jury. Standing alone,
an admission by silence might readily be challenged as insufficient
evidence to constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt and to support a conviction and severe sentence. The testimony of an addictinformer was sufficient corroborating testimony in the principal case
to support a conviction and heavy sentence. The West Virginia
court has indicated accord on the question but no clear and positive
ruling has been rendered.
Charles David McMunn

Federal Courts.-Diversity Jurisdiction of Foreign Corporation
P, a resident of Maryland, brought a libel action against D news
service, a New York corporation, in the United States District Court
for Vermont. Service was made upon an employee of D in Vermont.
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P alleged a news dispatch transmitted by D from Georgia to Vermont
contained a defamatory reference to him. The complaint did not
allege the dispatch was printed or broadcast or that P had suffered
any injury in Vermont. D moved to dismiss on the grounds of lack
of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and insufficiency of the
complaint. The district court, not considering the jurisdiction or
venue questions, dismissed. Held, reversed and remanded. A court
without jurisdiction lacks power to dismiss a complaint for failure to
state a claim. A federal district court exercising diversity jurisdiction
must apply state and not federal standards in determining whether D
foreign corporation was present within the district and amenable
to service of process there. A dissenting opinion held that the
adoption of a state standard implies discrimination ".

.

. against

citizens possessing federal diversity rights." Arrowsmith v. United
Press International, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
The problem of diversity jurisdiction over foreign corporations
has been settled in the majority of the circuits for many years. Within
a week of the decision in the principal case, three other cases were
decided which are in accord. Smartt v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp.,
318 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1963); Walker v. General Features Corp.,
319 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1963); and Houston FearlessCorp. v. Teter,
318 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1963).
Prior to the instant case, the Second Circuit relied on the "federal
standard" to determine whether a foreign corporation was amendable
to service of process. Their former position was expressed in Jaftex
Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960). X,
foreign corporation was impleaded by D sub-manufacturer. Service
was made upon an agent of X within the jurisdiction. The issue of
whether X was "present" or "doing business" within the jurisdiction
arose. It was held that whether or not a foreign corporation is "present" within a district to permit service of process upon it is a question
of federal law governing the procedure of the United States courts
and is to be determined accordingly.
The difficulty with the Jaftex case is in finding a federal standard
that is applicable. The decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), abolished the theory of a "federal common law,"
and the only rule applicable is in opposition to the Jaftex holding.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (7) states that service is ".

.

. sufficient if the

summons and complaint are served in the manner prescribed by any
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statute of the United States or in the manner prescribed by the law
of the state in which the service is made ...

"

There is no federal

statute.
The majority opinion of the Jaftex case was written by Judge
Clark. In his dissent in the principal case, Judge Clark concluded
that the basis of the majority opinion was a misinterpretation of Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra, which states, "a federal court exercising
jurisdiction over... a case on the ground of diversity of citizenship
is not free to treat this question as one of so-called 'general law,'
but must apply the state law as declared by the highest state court."
Judge Clark believes that this does not apply to procedural law, for in
so doing, the basis of a federal court for enforcing a litigant's rights
accorded by state law would be destroyed.
The majority opinion held that FED. R. Crw. P. 4(d) (3), urged
by Judge Clark as the federal standard, instructs as to how a foreign
corporation may be served, but fails to instruct as to when such
corporation is subject to service. It would appear logical that, no
federal standard being found, the state standard must be applicable.
If a "general law federal standard" were applied, state law would
be over-ridden, denying Meredith v. Winterhaven, 320 U.S. 228
(1943), wherein a federal court was charged with responsibility for
determining and applying state laws in all cases within its jurisdiction
in which the federal law does not govern.
Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir.
1948), held that there are two questions involved in determining
diversity jurisdiction: First, has the state acted through legislation
to bring a foreign corporation into its courts? And secondly, assuming the state has so acted, does this legislation violate the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment? In the principal case,
Vermont had acted through legislation to make certain foreign
corporations amenable to personal service of process. The federal
question then arises, and it may be resolved by application of the
doctrine of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945), stating, ".

.

. due process requires only that in order to

subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and justice." Accord, State ex rel.
CoralPools, Inc. v. Knapp, 131 S.E.2d 81 (W. Va. 1963); Gavenda
Bros. v. Elkins Limestone Co., 145 W. Va. 732, 116 S.E.2d 910
(1960).
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West Virginia has acted to make foreign corporations amenable
to service of process in W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art. 1, § 71 (Michie
1961). Therein a foreign corporation not authorized to do business
within the state but so doing is " . . . conclusively presumed

to have appointed the auditor of the state as its attorney in fact
with authority to accept service .

. .

."

The difficulty here arises

with the interpretation of "doing business." 62 W. VA. L. REv. 181
(1959). Walker v. GeneralFeaturesCorp., supra, held that whether
a corporation is doing business must be resolved by application of
state or local law rather than federal law. State interpretation of
"doing business" must be reasonable and consistent with due process
to fulfill the interpretation of the InternationalShoe Co. case.
The West Virginia concept of "doing business" has been discussed
in few cases. In Rorer v. People's Bldg., Loan & Sav. Ass'n., 47
W. Va. 1, 34 S.E. 758 (1899), it was held that a foreign corporation
can do business only through its agents. Kimball v. Sundstrom &
Stratton Co., 80 W. Va. 522, 92 S.E. 737 (1917), held that a
foreign corporation maintaining offices in the state for the transaction
of its business and employing persons there to look after its general
busipess and preserve its property, in view of continuing its business
within the state, is "doing business."
On the other hand, Cumberland Co-op. Bakeries Inc. v. Lawson,
91 W. Va. 245, 112 S.E. 568 (1922), held that a contract made in
the state for the sale of capital stock of a foreign corporation does not
constitute doing business, and General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Shadyside Coal Co., 102 W. Va. 402, 135 S.E. 272 (1926), held
that a foreign corporation financing the purchase of automobiles
secured by title to the vehicles, contracted for outside the state,
through being handled through local banks does not constitute doing
business.
It appears there is no set standard or recognized rule for determining the requirements of "doing business," but rather the determination
must be made upon the facts of each particular case applying the
state standard in a manner consistent with federal due process.
Charles Marion Love III
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